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Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime Bills of Lading:
The Supreme Court's Decision in Vimar Seguros Y
Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer
I. Introduction
A delicate balance exists between competing judicial interests in
promoting modern principles of international comity and commercial
practice in an expanding global market, while, at the same time,
protecting certain classes of contracting parties from being taken
advantage of due to inequality of bargaining power. An example of
this delicate balance arises in the context of foreign arbitration clauses
in maritime bills of lading.' In negotiating the terms of bills of lading,
a carrier of goods usually has superior bargaining power over the
owner of goods who is trying to get the carrier to transport the goods.
Absent statutory prohibitions, a carrier can often present the terms of
the bill, including an agreement to arbitrate disputes in a foreign
forum, on a "take it or leave it" basis. Courts deciding the validity of
such terms in maritime bills of lading face the dilemma of protecting
the weaker contracting party at the risk of stifling international
commerce and hurting international relations by demonstrating
disdain for the competence of foreign forums.
In Wmar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefe? the Supreme Court
attempted to address these competing interests in "resolv[ing] a Circuit
split on the enforceability of foreign arbitration clauses in maritime
bills of lading."' In resolving this Circuit split, the Court was confront-
ed with two issues. The first was whether a foreign arbitration clause
in a bill of lading was invalid under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA)4 "because it lessens liability in the sense that COGSA
I A "bill of lading" is defined as:
An instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his agent, describing the freight so
as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the terms of the contract for
carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight be delivered to the order or
assigns of a specified person at a specified place. It is a receipt for goods, contract
for carriage, and is documentary evidence of title to goods.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (6th ed. 1991).
2 115 S. Ct. 2322 (1995).
3 Id. at 2326.
4 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1970). The enabling clause of COGSA states that the Act
shall be the law applicable to all bills of lading in United States foreign trade, inbound or
outbound:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled. That every bill of lading or similar document
which is evidence of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from the ports
of the United States, in foreign trade, shall have effect subject to the provisions of
this Act.
Id. at § 1300; see infra notes 65, 120 for discussions of the purposes for COGSA and the
abuses it was designed to prevent.
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prohibits."5 The second issue concerned whether the substantive law
to be applied under the arbitration clause would reduce the obliga-
tions owed by the carrier of goods to the cargo owner below what
COGSA guarantees.'
The Supreme Court decided that COGSA's prohibition of a
carrier lessening its liability in a bill of lading did not apply to the
mere inconvenience and additional costs that a cargo owner might
experience as a result of arbitrating in a foreign forum.7 Since
COGSA was modeled on an international agreements under which no
other nation had declared a prohibition of foreign forum selection
clauses, the Court declined "to interpret our version of the Hague
Rules in a manner contrary to every other nation to have addressed the
issue."9 Furthermore, the Court determined that it would be prema-
ture to consider whether the foreign forum's application of substan-
tive law would lessen the carrier's liability under COGSA.' ° Because
the District Court retained jurisdiction over the case and would have
an opportunity to review the foreign forum's enforcement of the law,
the Court held that "mere speculation that the foreign arbitrators
might apply Japanese law which, depending on the proper construc-
tion of COGSA, might reduce [the carrier's] legal obligations, does
not in and of itself lessen liability under [the applicable provision of]
COGSA....""
Part II of this Note will examine the essential facts and procedural
history of Sky Reefer which led to its eventual determination by the
Supreme Court, as well as the Court's reasoning for its decision.12
Part III will discuss precedential cases and other background law
accepted and rejected by the Court." Part IV will analyze the
significance of Sky Reefer and the soundness of the Court's reasoning
in arriving at its conclusion. 4 Finally, Part V of this Note will critique
the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Sky Reefer and propose
alternative solutions to the issues addressed in the case) 5
5 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
6 Id. at 2329. "The central guarantee of [the COGSA provision at issue] is that the
terms of a bill of lading may not relieve the carrier of the obligations or diminish the legal
duties specified by [COGSA]." Id.
7 Id. at 2327-28.
8 Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading,
51 Stat. 233 (1924) [hereinafter Hague Rules].
9 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2328.
10 Id. at 2330.
11 Id.
12 See infra notes 16-74 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 75-132 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 133-164 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
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II. Statement of the Case
A. Essential Facts
Bacchus Associates (Bacchus), a wholesale fruit distributor in the
Northeast United States, contracted with Galaxie Negoce, S.A.
(Galaxie), a Moroccan fruit supplier, for the purchase of a shipload of
fruit.'6 Bacchus contracted for a ship, the Sky Reefer, to transport
the fruit from Morocco to Massachusetts.' 7 The Sky Reefer was
owned by M. H. Maritima, S.A. (Maritima), a Panamanian company,
who time-chartered the vessel to Honma Senpaku Co., Ltd., who in
turn time-chartered it to Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. (Nichiro), a
Japanese company.'8
Independent ship loaders, or stevedores, were hired by Galaxie to
load the fruit on to the ship. 9 Complying with the customary
procedures of international business transactions, Nichiro, acting as
carrier, issued a preprinted bill of lading to Galaxie, the shipper, upon
receipt of the cargo." Once the Sky Reefer set sail from Morocco,
Galaxie tendered the bill of lading to Bacchus pursuant to the terms
of a letter of credit posted in the carrier's favor.2'
The bill of lading listed the respective rights and responsibilities
of cargo owner and carrier, and included arbitration and choice-of-law
clauses as follows:
(1) The contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading
shall be governed by Japanese law.
(2) Any dispute arising from this Bill of Lading shall be referred to
arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo Maritime Arbitration Commission
(TOMAC) of the Japan Shipping Exchange, Inc., in accordance with the
rules of TOMAC and any amendment thereto, and the award given by the
arbitrators shall be final and binding on both parties.22
When the Sky Reefer arrived in Massachusetts, Bacchus discovered
that numerous boxes of oranges were crushed, resulting in over $1
16 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2325 (1995); Vimar
Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer (Sky Reefer 1), 29 F.3d 727, 728 (lst Cir. 1994).
17 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
18 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325; Sky Reefer 1, 29 F.3d at 728. A "charter" designates the
document in which are set forth the arrangements and contractual agreements entered into
when one person (the "charterer") takes over the use of the whole ship belonging to another
(the "owner"). GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES L. BLACK,JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 4-1 (2d
ed. 1975). A "time charter," is one in which "the owner's people... navigate and manage
the vessel, [and] her carrying capacity is taken by the charterer for a fixed time anywhere in
the world ... on as many voyages as approximately fit into the charter period." Id.
19 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
20 Id.
21 Id. A letter of credit is "an engagement, undertaking or promise by a bank to pay
money to or on behalf of the customer for whom it has issued the credit." GILMORE AND
BLACK, supra note 18, § 3-12.
22 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
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million in damages.3 Due to these damages, Vimar Seguros Y
Reaseguros (Vimar Seguros), Bacchus' marine insurer, paid Bacchus
$733,442.90 and became subrogated to Bacchus' rights. 24
B. Procedural History
Vimar Seguros and Bacchus filed an action for damages in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against
Maritima in personam and the Sky Reefer in rem. 25  The defendants
moved to stay the action and compel arbitration in Tokyo under the
arbitration clause in the bill of lading26 and section 3 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),27 which requires a federal district court, on the
application of one of the parties, to stay proceedings and enforce
arbitration agreements covered by the Act.28  Plaintiffs opposed the
motion on the grounds that the arbitration clause was unenforceable
because the clause violated section 3(8) of COGSA, 9 which prohibits
a carrier from "limiting [its] liability" in a contract for carriage. 0
The District Court held that the arbitration clause was enforceable,
granted defendants' motion to stay litigation and compel arbitration,
retained jurisdiction pending arbitration, and certified for interlocutory
appeal the question of "[w]hether [COGSA sec. 3(8)] nullifies an
arbitration clause contained in a bill of lading governed by COGSA."3'
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District
Court's order to arbitrate. 2 The Court of Appeals assumed that the
arbitration clause was invalid under COGSA3 but held that the FAA,
23 Id.; Sky Reefer , 29 F.3d at 728.
24 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
25 Id.
26 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325; see id. at 2336-37 (Stevens,J., dissenting). See Sky Reefer
1, 29 F.3d at 731 for further discussions of the provisions and meaning of the FAA.
29 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325. Plaintiffs also argued that the arbitration clause was
unenforceable as a contract of adhesion, but the District Court rejected this argument
because the FAA explicitly defined such clauses in maritime bills of lading as enforceable and
because Bacchus was a sophisticated party capable of negotiating the terms of such
transactions. Id.
30 Id. Section 3(8) of COGSA provides as follows:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or
the ship from liability for loss or damage or in connection with the goods, arising
from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties or obligations provided in this
section, or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be
null and void and of no effect.
46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs contended that both the
inconvenience and costs of arbitrating in Japan and the possible application ofJapanese law
improperly limited the carrier's liability. Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325.
31 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2325-26.
32 Sky Reefer 1, 29 F.3d at 733.
33 Id. at 730. Despite proceeding on this assumption, the First Circuit expressed doubt
that the clause actually lessened liability under COGSA. Id.
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as the later enacted and more specific statute, "alone governs the
validity of arbitration clauses, both foreign and domestic, and
consequently removes them from the grasp of COGSA."34
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" "to resolve a Circuit split
on the enforceability of foreign arbitration clauses in maritime bills of
lading"3 6 and, in a seven-to-one decision, affirmed the judgment of
the First Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.37
C. Reasoning of the Supreme Court
1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court held that the foreign arbitration clause did
not lessen the carrier's liability under COGSA and that it would be
premature to consider whether to nullify the clause on the grounds
that the Japanese arbitrators might not apply COSGA.38
a. Foreign Arbitration Clause Does Not Lessen Carrier's
Liability Under COGSA
Unlike the Court of Appeals, the majority declined to assume that
the foreign arbitration clause in question violated COGSA and instead
reasoned that the clause did not lessen the carrier's liability, thereby
obviating any conflict between COGSA and the FAA. 9 In so doing,
the majority rejected a line of appellate decisions invalidating foreign
forum selection clauses under section 3(8) of COGSA and relied on
cases outside the realm of maritime bills of lading.4
The majority cited the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranbor4' as the leading case for
the nullification of a foreign forum selection clause and recognized
that, "[fiollowing Indussa, the Courts of Appeals without exception
have invalidated foreign forum selection clauses under sec. 3(8). "4"
34 Id. at 731-32.
35 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SA. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 571 (mem.) (1994).
36 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2326. To exemplify the Circuit split, the Court referred to a
comparison between Sky Reefer!, a First Circuit decision enforcing a foreign arbitration clause,
assuming arguendo it violated COGSA, with State Establishment for Agricultural Product
Trading v. M/V Wesermunde, 838 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1988), an Eleventh Circuit case
declining to enforce a foreign arbitration clause because that would violate COGSA. Sky
Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2330. See infra notes 124-132 and accompanying text.
37 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2330. Justice Breyer took no part in the decision. Id.
38 Id. at 2326-30.
39 Id. at 2326. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded: " [b]ecause we hold
that foreign arbitration clauses in bills of lading are not invalid under COGSA in all circum-
stances, both the FAA and COGSA may be given full effect." Id. at 2330.
40 Id. at 2326-29.
41 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc).
42 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2326.
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Despite this clear line of precedent, the Sky Reefer Court rejected the
Indussa rule,43 which had held "that COGSA invalidated a clause
designating a foreign judicial forum because it 'puts a high hurdle' in
the way of enforcing liability, and thus is an effective means for carriers
to secure settlements lower than if cargo [owners] could sue in a
convenient forum.""
The majority in Sky Reefer rejected the Indussa rule because the
Court interpreted section 3(8) of COGSA to prohibit only "the
lessening of the specific liability imposed by the Act, without address-
ing the separate question of the means and costs of enforcing that
liability."4" The Court noted that section 3 of COGSA delineated the
particular substantive obligations and procedures which a carrier may
not alter to its advantage in a bill of lading, none of which "prevent[]
the parties from agreeing to enforce these obligations in a particular
forum. "46
The majority drew support from the Court's decision in Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute4 7 in which the Court determined that a
Florida forum selection clause in a cruise ticket purchased by
Washington residents did not lessen liability in violation of the
Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act, a statute containing
prohibitions against lessening liability much like those in COGSA.48
In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that the cost and inconvenience of traveling a great distance lessened
plaintiffs' ability to recover. 9
The Sky Reefer Court took the holding of the Carnival Cruise Line
Court, which read "lessening liability" to exclude increases in the
transaction costs of litigation in domestic forum selection clauses, and
extended it to the context of foreign forum selection clauses,
concluding that: "Even if it were reasonable to read sec. 3(8) to make
a distinction based on travel time, airfare, and hotel bills, these factors
are not susceptible of a simple and enforceable distinction between
domestic and foreign forums." ° Thus, the Sky Reefer Court held that
43 Id.
44 Id. (quoting Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203). Furthermore, the Indussa court reasoned
"there could be no assurance that [the foreign court] would apply [COGSA] in the same way
as would an American tribunal subject to the uniform control of the Supreme Court."
Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203-04.
45 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327.
46 Id.
47 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
48 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595-97).
49 Id. (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 596-97).
50 Id. The majority went on to state: "It would be unwieldy and unsupported by the
terms or policy of the statute to require courts to proceed case by case to tally the costs and
burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means, the size of their claims, and the
relative burden on the carrier." Id. at 2328.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment that increased costs of litigating in a
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the lessening of liability prohibition of COGSA should be limited to
issues of substance and should not encompass increases in the
transaction costs of litigation in a merely inconvenient forum."
Furthermore, the majority reasoned that modern principles of
international comity and commercial practice support the enforcement
of foreign arbitration clauses in maritime bills of lading. 2 The Court
noted that COGSA is modeled on the Hague Rules, an international
convention under which none of its signatories have interpreted their
domestic enactment of section 3(8) to prohibit foreign forum selection
clauses."3 Thus, the majority held:
In light of the fact that COGSA is the culmination of a multilateral effort
"to establish uniform ocean bills of lading to govern the rights and
liabilities of carriers and shippers inter se in international trade," we
decline to interpret our version of the Hague Rules in a manner contrary
to every other nation to have addressed the issue."4
Similarly, " [i] t would also be out of keeping with the objects of the
[Hague Rules] for the courts of this country to interpret COGSA to
disparage the authority or competence of international forums for
dispute resolution."55 In support of this proposition, the majority
relied on the Court's decision in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
(The Bremen)56 in which the Court, recognizing the realities of the
expanding global market, enforced a foreign forum selection clause in
an international contract and stated: "The expansion of American
business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding
solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."5 7
In summarizing its belief that contemporary commercial realities
and the importance of international comity dictate enforcement of
foreign forum selection clauses, the Sky Reefer Court stated:
If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international
distant forum do not lessen liability under COGSA, but declined to reject the Indussa rule
because she perceived a difference between foreign arbitration clauses, as here, and true
forum selection clauses. Id. at 2330 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). But see
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (holding that foreign arbitration clauses
are but a subset of foreign forum selection clauses in general); infra note 84 and accompany-
ing text.
51 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327-28.
52 Id. at 2328.
53 Id. The Court stated that the English courts have long since rejected the reasoning
adopted by the Indussa court and noted that, in those countries that have invalidated foreign
forum selection clauses, the countries have only done so pursuant to specific provisions to
that effect in domestic versions of the Hague Rules. Id.
54 Id. (quoting Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 301
(1959)). The Court pointed out that the FAA is also based on an international agreement,
one that was intended to encourage the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in international contracts. Id. at 2328.
55 Id.
56 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
57 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2328 (quoting The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9).
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accords and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its
courts should be most cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation
in such manner as to violate international agreements. That concern
counsels against construing COGSA to nullify foreign arbitration clauses
because of inconvenience to the plaintiff or insular distrust of the ability
of foreign arbitrators to apply the law.5
b. Consideration of Japanese Arbitrators' Application of
COGSA Would Be Premature
The majority in Sky Reefer declined to consider Bacchus' argument
that the arbitration clause should not be enforced because the
Japanese version of the Hague Rules, which the Japanese arbitrators
might choose to apply, would provide the carrier with a defense
unavailable under COGSA, and thereby lessen its liability.59 Whether
or not Bacchus' reading of the law was correct, the Court held that its
claim was premature because, at the interlocutory stage of enforcing
the arbitration agreement, it had not yet been established what law the
arbitrators would apply, and the District Court, by virtue of retaining
jurisdiction over the case, would have the opportunity to review the
judgment of the Japanese forum.'0
2. Dissent
Justice Stevens dissented to the majority opinion in Sky Reefer,
stating that the Court "unwisely discards settled law and adopts a novel
construction of sec. 3(8). "6 Stevens traced the history of COGSA and
its predecessor, the Harter Act, and the cases that have interpreted
these statutes and concluded:
[O]ur interretation of maritime law prior to the enactment of the
Harter Act,[ ], our reading of that statute in Knott,['3 ] and the federal
courts' consistent interpretation of COGSA, [64] buttressed by scholarly
58 Id. at 2329.
59 Id. Bacchus argued that Japanese law would permit the carrier a defense based on
the acts or omissions of the stevedores who loaded the fruit on to the ship. Id.; see supra note
19 and accompanying text.
60 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2329-30. Here, the Court relied on its prior decision in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Sy Reefer, 115
S. Ct. at 2329-30. In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court stated that there was no need to speculate
on a foreign arbitral tribunal's application of American law at the stage when one party is
seeking to enforce the agreement to arbitrate because "the national courts of the United
States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate
interest in the enforcement of [American] law has been addressed." Mitsubishi Motors, 473
U.S. at 638.
61 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195 (1979)) (containing a
prohibition against a carrier relieving itself of liability).
63 Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900) (holding choice-of-law clause invalid
because of the Harter Act's prohibition against a carrier relieving itself of liability).
64 See infra part III.B for a discussion of the Indussa line of cases.
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recognition of the commercial interest in uniformity,['] demonstrate
that the clauses in the Japanese carrier's bill of lading purporting to
require arbitration in Tokyo pursuant to Japanese law both would have
been held invalid under COGSA prior to today.'
Stevens argued that the majority construed section 3(8) too
narrowly and that Congress intended for the statute's prohibition to
encompass clauses in bills of lading that allow carriers to take
advantage of their superior bargaining power.6 1 Stevens also contend-
ed that the majority's opinion would damage the negotiability and
uniformity of bills of lading, qualities that the financial community
relies upon and that COGSA was designed to protect. Therefore,
Stevens argued, the majority's reliance on Carnival Cruise Lines was
misplaced because such statutory and public policy concerns were not
implicated therein.' Finally, Stevens did not believe that invalidating
the foreign arbitration clause would harm international commitments,
as such obligations do not require enforcement of adhesionary clauses
or those in violation of domestic statutes.69
Convinced of the overwhelming logic of his dissent, Stevens
suspected that the majority really turned its back on the "clear
meaning of COGSA and decades of precedent" in order to avoid
conflict between COGSA and the FAA.7 ° To obviate such a result,
Stevens proposed an interpretation of the statutes which would
demonstrate that there is no conflict between the two.? Because the
FAA permits invalidation of an arbitration clause "upon such grounds
as exist at law ... for the revocation of any contract,"7" and illegality
under COGSA arguably is such an independent ground, Stevens
65 See, e.g., GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 18, § 3-25:
[COGSA] allows a freedom of contracting out of its terms, but only in the direction
of increasing the shipowner's liabilities, and never in the direction of diminishing
them. This apparent onesidedness is a commonsense recognition of the inequality
in bargaining power which both Harter and Cogsa were designed to redress, and of
the fact that one of the great objectives of both Acts is to prevent the impairment
of the value and negotiability of the ocean bill of lading.
(cited with approval in Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d
7, 10-12 (2d Cir. 1969)).
66 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SA v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2333 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
67 Id. at 2334 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens feared that foreign arbitration clauses
would result in shipper transaction costs that would either exceed potential recovery or unrea-
sonably lessen net recovery. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also felt that the
application of potentially disadvantageous legal standards was sufficient to improperly limit
a carrier's liability under COGSA, and that the District Court's ability to review such
application was inadequate protection for the shipper. Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) to demonstrate the difficult burden a shipper
would face in trying to challenge an arbitration decision).
68 Id. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
69 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
71 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 9 U.S.C. § 2; see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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concluded that there is no conflict between the statutes. 73 Thus,
there was no need for the majority to reject clear precedent for the
sole reason, as Stevens perceived, of avoiding conflict between two
federal statutes.
74
III. Background Law
A. Cases Supporting the Majority Decision
The majority in Sky Reefer relied on decisions outside the context
of COGSA and maritime bills of lading in rejecting the Indussa rule
and holding that a foreign arbitration clause did not improperly lessen
a carrier's liability under COGSA 7" The first of these decisions, MIS
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company (The Bremen) ,76 discarded the
traditional American view of forum selection clauses as improperly
"ousting" a court of jurisdiction and instead enforced such a clause as
a valid, freely negotiated agreement."
In The Bremen, the Supreme Court considered whether to enforce
a forum selection clause in an international towage contract between
two sophisticated parties. 7  The Court decided that "such clauses are
prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown
by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstanc-
es."79, Applying this standard to the circumstances of the parties in
The Bremen, the Court determined that the clause at issue was not
unreasonable because it was freely negotiated by sophisticated parties
who intended to bring certainty to the transaction and that any
inconvenience suffered by litigating in the contractual forum was
clearly foreseeable to the parties at the time of contracting. °
73 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2337 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 2326-29; see supra notes 47-50, 56-57 and accompanying text.
76 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
77 Id. See PatrickJ. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival
Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55 (1992) for discussion of the
traditional American view of the "ouster" doctrine.
78 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 1-2. An American corporation contracted with a German
corporation to tow the former's drilling rig from Louisiana to a point in the Adriatic Sea
off the coast of Italy. Id. at 2. The German company's contract contained a forum selection
clause requiring dispute resolution before the London Court ofJustice. Id. The American
company made several changes to the contract, but did not amend the forum selection
clause. Id. at 3. When a storm damaged the rig in international waters and the American
company commenced a suit in admiralty in United States District Court for damages, the
German corporation invoked the forum clause of the towage contract. Id. at 3-4.
79 Id. at 10. The Court stated that fraud, undue influence, or "overweening" bargaining
power would also serve as sufficient grounds to hold a forum selection clause unenforceable.
See id. at 12-13. The Court noted that Indussa, which invalidated a forum selection clause as
a "lessening of liability" in contravention of COGSA, might provide an additional basis for not
enforcing such clauses, but that COGSA was not applicable to The Bremen case. Id, at 10 n. 11.
80 Id. at 17-18. The Bremen Court was careful to distinguish the circumstances of the
parties before them from the very different situation of an agreement between two Americans
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The Court reasoned that the traditional American disdain for
forum selection clauses had no place in an "era of expanding world
trade and commerce" and stated: "The expansion of American
business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding
solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."8 The Court
argued that forum selection clauses provide certainty in contracting
and encourage international commerce, as well as accord with
concepts of freedom of contract long accepted in other common-law
countries.
82
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court, in Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver,8" extended the rule from The Bremen regarding forum selection
clauses to include foreign arbitration clauses in international con-
tracts.84 In Scherk, an American company contracted with a European
businessman for the purchase of the latter's business enterprises and
trademarks. The contract contained a clause providing for all claims
and controversies arising out of the agreement to be referred to
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris."5
When the American company sued the European businessman for
fraudulent misrepresentation under 'the Securities and Exchange Act,
the businessman attempted to stay the action pending arbitration
pursuant to the agreement.86  The Court enforced the arbitration
clause in accordance with the explicit provisions of the FAA, which
provide "that an arbitration agreement such as is here involved 'shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'""'
The Court reasoned:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is ... an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential
to resolve a local dispute in a "remote alien forum." In such a case, the Court stated:
[T] he serious inconvenience of the contractual forum to one or both of the parties
might carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause.
The remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive
one, or that the parties did not have the particular controversy in mind when they
made their agreement . . . . Similarly, selection of a remote forum to apply
differing foreign law to an essentially American controversy might contravene an
important public policy of the forum.
Id. at 17.
81 Id. at 9.
82 Id. at 11-14.
83 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
84 Id. The Court stated: "An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in
effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but
also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute." Id. at 519; see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
85 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 508.
86 Id. at 509.
87 Id. at 510-13 (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2).
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to any international business transaction. Furthermore, such a provision
obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or
unfamiliar with the problem area involved.'
Relying on The Bremen, the Scherk majority held that an invalidation of
such an agreement would "damage the fabric of international
commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of
businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements." 89
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas argued: "When a foreign
corporation undertakes fraudulent action which subjects it to the
jurisdiction of our federal securities laws, nothing justifies the
conclusion that only a diluted version of those laws protects American
investors."9 °  The dissent contended that the Court's decision in
Wilko v. Swan,9 that courts and not arbitration tribunals had jurisdic-
tion over suits under the Securities Act, should control.92
Justice Douglas maintained that neither the relative bargaining
power of the contracting parties nor principles of international comity
were relevant when dealing with securities and warned against the
majority's "invocation of the 'international contract' talisman" to get
around the national public policy represented by Wilko.93 Finally, the
dissent listed some of the substantial rights a party may lose in
arbitrating in a foreign forum: the arbitral award can be made without
record and therefore be functionally unreviewable; a plaintiff loses
pretrial discovery and choice of venue rights available in federal court;
and, foreign arbitrators may improperly interpret substantive law.
94
The Sky Reefer Court placed great emphasis on the Court's earlier
decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.95 In this case, Washing-
ton residents purchased cruise tickets through a travel agency from a
Florida-based cruise line. The tickets contained a Florida forum
selection clause. 96 When one of the passengers was injured and sued
the cruise line in federal court in Washington for negligence, the
cruise line moved for summary judgment based on the forum selection
clause.97 The Supreme Court held that the forum selection clause
was enforceable and did not violate a federal statute prohibiting vessel
88 Id. at 516.
89 Id. at 517-18. The Court quoted M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 407
U.S. 1, 9 (1972): "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international
waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." Id. at 519.
90 Id. at 530-31 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
91 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
92 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 525 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 525-31 (DouglasJ., dissenting).
q4 Id. at 532 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see infra notes 151-152 and accompanying text.
95 499 U.S. 585 (1991). The case was decided by a seven-to-two margin. Id.; see supra
notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
96 Id. at 587-88.
97 Id. at 588.
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owners from relieving themselves of liability in agreements with their
passengers. 98
The majority in Carnival Cruise Lines determined that The Bremen
decision's emphasis on free negotiation between sophisticated parties
as justification for enforcing a forum selection clause did not bar
enforcement of a nonnegotiated clause simply because the latter was
not the product of negotiation.99 The Court reasoned that the
business context of a preprinted ticket contract was much different
than that of the towage contract in The Bremen and, as such, withstood
judicial scrutiny for reasonableness and fundamental fairness, even in
the absence of free negotiation. 0
The majority also decided that the forum selection clause did not
violate the statutory prohibition against a vessel owner relieving himself
of liability to a passenger.' Because the plaintiff could pursue her
claim in Florida, the Court held that the clause at issue did not take
away the passenger's right to "a trial by [a] court of competent
jurisdiction" and that there was no authority to suggest that Congress
intended the statute "to avoid having a plaintiff travel to a distant
forum in order to litigate."'02  The Court concluded: "Because the
clause before us allows for judicial resolution of claims against [the
cruise line] and does not purport to limit [its] liability for negligence,
it does not violate sec. 183(c)." 1 3
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, argued that courts
"traditionally have reviewed with heightened scrutiny the terms of
98 Id. at 590-97.
9 Id. at 593.
100 Id. at 593-95. The Court listed the following reasons for enforcing the clause and
distinguishing the reasoning of The Bremen: (1) The forum selection clause could have spared
the passengers and the judiciary the time and expense of litigating over the proper forum;
(2) The passengers benefitted from lower fares as a result of the cruise line's savings in
limiting the fora in which it may be sued; (3) Florida is not a "remote alien forum" for which
The Bremen would have found an exception to the general validity of forum selection clauses
(see supra note 80); (4) There was no indication that the cruise line intended to discourage
passengers from pursuing legitimate claims; (5) There was no evidence of fraud or over-
reaching-, and (6) The passengers had notice of the forum provision and could have rejected
the contract. Id. at 593-95.
101 Id. at 595-97. 46 U.S.C. § 183(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for the.. . owner of any vessel transporting passengers between
ports of the United States or between any such port and a foreign port to insert in
any rule, regulation, contract, or agreement any provision or limitation (1) purport-
ing, in the event of loss of life or bodily injury arising from the negligence or fault
of such owner or his servants, to relieve such owner... from liability .... or (2)
purporting in such event to lessen, weaken, or avoid the light of any claimant to a trial
by court of competent jurisdiction on the question of liabitity for such loss or injuy ...... All
such provisions or limitations contained in such rule, regulation, contract, or agree-
ment are hereby declared to be against public policy and shall be null and void and
of no effect.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
102 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 596.
103 Id. at 596-97.
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contracts of adhesion, form contracts offered on a take-or-leave basis
by a party with stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker
power,"4 and that, The Bremen notwithstanding, "the prevailing rule
is still that forum-selection clauses are not enforceable if they are not
freely bargained for, create additional expense for one party, or deny
one party a remedy."' The dissent concluded: "The stipulation in
the ticket that Carnival Cruise sold to [the passengers] certainly lessens
or weakens their ability to recover for the slip and fall incident
,,106
B. Cases Supporting the Dissent's View That Foreign Arbitration
Clauses Violate COGSA
The majority in Sky Reefer recognized that "[t]he leading case for
invalidation of a foreign forum selection clause is the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg
107 In Indussa, a New York corporation contracted with a
Belgian carrier to transport goods from Belgium to California.'0 8 In
the maritime bill of lading evidencing the contract, a clause provided
for dispute resolution in the country and under the laws where the
carrier had his principal place of business.'
0 9
When the New York shipper sued the carrier in federal court in
New York for damages to the goods, the carrier, claiming that its
principal place of business was in Norway, moved for an order
declining jurisdiction based on the forum selection clause.'10 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the clause lessened
the carrier's liability in violation of section 3(8) of COGSA,"'
stating:
We think that Congress meant to invalidate any contractual provision in
a bill of lading for a shipment to or from the United States that would
prevent cargo [owners] able to obtain jurisdiction over a carrier in an
American court from having that court entertain the suit and apply the
substantive rules Congress had prescribed."'
104 Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens supported this conclusion by
referring to the Indussa line of cases: "The Courts of Appeals, construing an analogous
provision of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 et seq. [sic], have
unanimously held invalid as limitations on liability forum-selection clauses requiring suit in
foreign jurisdictions." Id. at 604 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SA. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2326 (1995).
108 Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (en banc).
109 Id. at 201.
110 Id.
III See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
112 Indussa, 377 F.2d at 204. In a footnote to this holding, the court stated: "Our ruling
does not touch the question of arbitration clauses in bills of lading which require this to be
held abroad." Id. at 204 n.4. The court went on to state that the FAA would presumably take
precedence over COGSA with respect to arbitration clauses, thereby upholding the validity
[VOL. 21
FOREIGN ARBITRATION CLAUSES
The Indussa court reasoned that a foreign forum selection clause
lessens a carrier's liability in that it "puts 'a high hurdle' in the way of
enforcing liability . .. and thus is an effective means for carriers to
secure settlements lower than if cargo [owners] could sue in a
convenient forum."" 3 The court stated that there is no way to "bind
[a] foreign court in its choice of applicable law,"" 4 and, even if the
court did apply the appropriate regime (e.g., COGSA), "there could
be no assurance that it would apply [COGSA] in the same way as
would an American tribunal subject to the uniform control of the
Supreme Court, and 3(8) can well be read as covering a potential and
not simply a demonstrable lessening of liability."'"15
Many other courts of appeals' decisions have adopted and
expanded upon the Indussa rule. One of the first was the opinion of
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Union Insurance Society
of Canton v. S.S. Elikon."6 In Elikon, a Middle Eastern buyer contract-
ed with an American manufacturer for the purchase of air condition-
ers."' A German carrier provided a preprinted bill of lading cover-
ing the cargo which contained a forum selection clause requiring
litigation in a German court."8 When the cargo was damaged and
the subrogee insurance company of the buyer sued the carrier in
federal court in Virginia, the carrier challenged jurisdiction based on
the forum selection clause." 9 The Fourth Circuit determined that,
in accordance with Indussa, the clause at issue violated COGSA and
"cannot alone preclude the district court from entertaining jurisdiction
of this case." 20
The Elikon court stated that Indussa "recognized that enforcement
of foreign arbitration clauses. Id.
113 Id. at 203 (citation omitted). The Indussa court drew support from Knott v. Botany
Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900), a case in which the Supreme Court, under COGSA's predecessor,
the Harter Act, declined to give effect to a clause making the law of the carrier's flag
applicable. Indussa, 377 F.2d at 203.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 203-04.
116 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981).117 Id. at 722.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 722-23.
120 Id. at 723. As part of its reasoning, the court provided a discussion of the goals of
COGSA, the American enactment of the Hague Rules:
COGSA is... part of an international effort to achieve uniformity and simplifica-
tion of bills of lading used in international trade. It was intended to reduce
uncertainty concerning the responsibilities and liabilities of carriers, the responsibili-
ties and rights of shippers and the liabilities of underwriters who insure waterborne
cargo. By strictly circumscribing the ability of carriers to avoid liability on cargoes
in their care, COGSA also greatly enhances the negotiability of bills of lading.
Subsequent holders of a bill subject to COGSA can give value for it in confidence
that they can ultimately obtain satisfaction thereon without elaborately investigating
the circumstances of the shipment.
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of foreign forum selection clauses could lead to the recrudescence of
bills of lading that would effectively frustrate shippers' ability to
recover damages from negligent carriers."'' The court distinguished
The Bremen from the facts of the case before it, concluding that: (1)
The Supreme Court stated in The Bremen that COGSA did not apply to
that case; 22 (2) The Bremen involved hard bargaining and not the
form clauses of an adhesion contract, as here; and (3) "Congress
intended COGSA to ameliorate this very difficulty of bills of lading with
one-sided form provisions... [and] the general policy [of The Bremen,
that such clauses are presumptively valid,] must recede before the
specific policy enunciated by Congress through COGSA."1
21
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in State Establish-
ment for Agricultural Product Trading v. M/V Wesermunde,124 extended
the Indussa rule invalidating foreign forum selection clauses under
COGSA to also invalidate foreign arbitration clauses. In Wesermunde,
an Iraqi government agency contracted with the M/V Wesermunde for
the carriage of eggs from Florida to Jordan. 25  The owner of the
Wesermunde entered into a charter party agreement which contained
an arbitration clause providing for arbitration in London; the bill of
lading expressly incorporated this arbitration clause by reference.
26
When fire on board the ship damaged the eggs and the Iraqi agency
sued in federal court in Florida for damages, the defendants moved to
have the dispute referred to arbitration in London pursuant to the
arbitration clause. 27 The Eleventh Circuit invalidated the clause as
violative of COGSA.128
The Wesermunde court acknowledged that arbitration alone is not
per se violative of COGSA, especially in light of the FAA, but did
determine that:
[A] provision requiring arbitration in a foreign country that has no
connection with either the performance of the bill of lading contract or
the making of the bill of lading contract is a provision that would conflict
with COGSA's general purpose of not allowing carriers to lessen their
121 Id. at 724.
122 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
123 Elikon, 642 F.2d at 724-25. Other federal courts have followed precisely the reasoning
of Indussa and Elikon in invalidating forum selection clauses in bills of lading as violative of
COGSA. See, e.g., Hughes Drilling Fluids v. M/V Luo Fu Shan, 852 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989); Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose, 826 F.2d 1441
(5th Cir. 1987); Pacific Lumber & Shipping Co., Inc. v. Star Shipping A/S, 464 F.Supp. 1314
(W.D.Wash. 1979).
124 838 F.2d 1576 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 916 (1988). Contra supra note
111 regarding the Indussa court's explicit statement that its ruling does not apply to foreign
arbitration clauses.
125 Wesermunde, 838 F.2d at 1578.
126 Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text regarding "charter party."
127 Wesermunde, 838 F.2d at 1578.
128 Id. at 1580-81.
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risk of liability.' 29
Because the negotiation and performance of the bill of lading contract
took place outside of England, the situs of the contractual forum, and
because the charterer, not even a named defendant, was the only party
related to the English forum, the court believed that enforcement of
arbitration in London "would have the effect in this case of lessening
liability of the carrier."13
0
Even if the clause did not per se violate section 3(8) of COGSA,
the Wesermunde court held that:
[When a bill of lading provision] arguably conflict[s] with COGSA's
implied policy that an American forum will be made available to a
consignee when a bill of lading is issued subject to the terms of that Act
... [,] the consignee must be given actual notice of the conflicting
provision before entering into the contract in order to have that provision
enforced.
13 l
Since there was no express agreement between the parties that
COGSA's protections would not apply, and the terms of the bill of
lading were more form clauses of an adhesion contract than they were
the product of hard bargaining, the court concluded that no actual
notice was provided and that the arbitration clause was therefore
ineffective. 3 2
IV. Significance of the Case
The Supreme Court's decision in Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v.
M/VSky Reefer to enforce a foreign arbitration clause in a maritime bill
of lading abruptly overturned a long history of settled law'33 and will
have far-reaching implications in international commerce. Carriers of
goods by sea to and from ports of the United States may now insert
into bills of lading arbitration or forum selection clauses that mandate
resolution of disputes arising under the contracts of carriage to take
place at the location and according to the procedure of the carriers'
choice. 34  This Note will now examine the extent to which the
reasoning of the majority in Sky Reefer justifies the magnitude of its
result.
129 Id. at 1581. The court emphasized COGSA's "power to void overreaching clauses
inserted by carriers in their bills of lading that unreasonably limit the carrier's liability or
obstructs the freight claimant's ability to secure redress" as the rationale behind the Indussa
rule that forum selection clauses limit the liability of the carrier. Id. at 1580.
130 Id. at 1581.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1581-82.
is3 See supra part III.B.
134 Because the Sky Reefer Court, in reaching its conclusion regarding arbitration clauses
clearly repudiated the reasoning of Indussa and instead adopted the rationale of Carnival
Cruise Lines, both choice of forum cases, it is evident that the Sy Reefer approval of foreign
arbitration clauses applies to foreign forum selection clauses as well. See supra notes 41-50
and accompanying text.
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A. The Majority's Formalistic Reading of "Lessening Liability" Under
COGSA Appears to Have Ignored its Practical Meaning
The majority in Sky Reefer interpreted section 3(8) of COGSA to
prohibit only the lessening of "liability for loss or damage... arising
from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties or obligations provided
in this section"1 5 and not to "prevent[] the parties from agreeing to
enforce these obligations in a particular forum."'36 In making this
distinction, the Court was able to distinguish forum selection and
arbitration clauses, which would arguably only result in additional costs
and inconvenience to the cargo owner, from a clause purporting to
limit a carrier's liability for negligence or other enumerated responsi-
bilities, which would violate the substantive obligations of COGSA." 7
The Court believed it was premature to consider whether the foreign
forum's potentially improper application of COGSA would lessen the
carrier's liability because the District Court would have an opportunity
to review such application at the award enforcement stage of the
proceedings.'3 8 The majority's reasoning in reaching these conclu-
sions arguably failed to take into account the practical effects of
enforcing a foreign forum selection or arbitration clause in a maritime
bill of lading.
1. Foreign Forum Selection and Arbitration Clauses Can Actually
Lessen a Carrier's Liability Within the Meaning of COGSA
Section 3(8) of COGSA was designed to ameliorate carriers'
historic tendency to exploit their superior bargaining power with
respect to bills of lading by exculpating themselves from liability under
the terms of such bills. 9 In light of this purpose, Justice Stevens
maintained that "it is perfectly clear that a foreign forum selection
clause 'relieves' or 'lessens' the carrier's liability."140 In many cargo
disputes, a cargo owner's costs in litigating in a distant forum will
135 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SA v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2327
(1995) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8)); see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
136 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2327. The Court stated: "By its terms, [COGSA] establishes
certain duties and obligations, separate and apart from the mechanisms for their
enforcement." Id.
137 Id. at 2328. The Court, extending its holding in Carnival Cruise Lines from domestic
to foreign forum selection clauses, read "'lessening such liability' to exclude increases in the
transaction costs of litigation . I..." Id.
138 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
139 See, e.g., Benjamin W. Yancey, The Carriage of Goods: Hague, COGSA, Visby, and
Hamburg, 57 TUL. L. REv. 1238 (1983) (providing a history of United States law regarding the
liability of carriers to owners of goods); see also supra notes 65, 129 and accompanying text.
140 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2335 (Stevens,J, dissenting). The Indussa line of cases, Elikon
and Wesermundein particular, effectively demonstrate how foreign forum selection and arbitra-
tion clauses can lessen a carrier's liability in a practical sense. See supra notes 111-115, 121-
123, 129-130 and accompanying text.
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exceed his potential recovery or at least make it impractical for the
cargo owner to bother pursuing the matter.14" ' The Sky Reefer majori-
ty's construction of section 3(8) to exclude such results as a lessening
of liability under the statute merely because they were procedural and
not substantive is therefore arguably inconsistent with the purpose of
COGSA. 
4 2
2. The Majority's Analogy to Carnival Cruise Lines May
Have Been Inapposite
The Sky Reefer majority relied on the Court's construction of a
different statute in Carnival Cruise Lines tojustify its narrow reading of
section 3(8) of COGSA."' However, because the statute at issue in
Carnival Cruise Lines only dealt with "the allocation of rights and duties
between shippers and carriers"' 44 in a domestic context and not the
-broader concerns of uniformity and negotiability of maritime bills of
lading addressed in COGSA, the Court's interpretation of the former
statute should not be relevant to the facts of Sky Reefer.
It is understood that COGSA was part of an international effort to
achieve uniformity in bills of lading used in international trade and to
prevent impairment of their negotiability.'45  If each carrier is
permitted to dictate a different forum for enforcing each bill of lading,
then the ensuing uncertainty might damage the negotiability of the
bills. 6 Because the statutory interpretation in Carnival Cruise Lines
regarding "the enforceability of the ticket's terms did not implicate
the commercial interests in uniformity and negotiability that are served
141 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote: "As a
practical matter.... in such a case no matter how clear the carrier's formal liability may be,
it would make no sense for the consignee or its subrogee to enforce that liability." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) "The shipper will ... be inclined either to settle the claim at a
discount or to forego bringing the claim at all." Id. at 2333 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 SeeCharles L. Black,Jr., The Bremen, COGSA and the Problem of Conflicting Interpretation,
6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 365 (1973). Professor Black, anticipating that a court may try to
extend the holding from The Bremen to a forum selection clause in a bill of lading, counseled:
[I]t is hard to see how it can be looked on as other than a "lessening" of the
carrier's liability under COGSA to remit the bill of lading holder to a distant
foreign court. It is quite true that the difficulty imposed would vary with the
circumstances; Canada is not Pakistan. But there is always some palpable
"lessening," for if the choice-of-forum clause is ever enforced, the result must be to
dismiss the litigant out of the United States court he has chosen to sue in. On most
moderate-sized claims, remission to the foreign forum is a practical immunization
of the carrier from liability. I hope we have not relapsed into such arid conceptual-
ism as to make anything of the classification of this practical "lessening" as
.procedural" rather than "substantive."
Id. at 368-69.
143 See supra notes 47-50, 137 and accompanying text.
144 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 See, e.g., supra notes 120, 139 and accompanying text.
14 Justice Stevens stated: "COGSA recognizes that this negotiability depends in part
upon the financial community's capacity to rely on the enforceability, in an accessible
forum, of the bill's terms." Sy Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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by the statutory regulation of bills of lading," 47 it was questionable
for the Sky Reefer majority to apply Carnival Cruise Lines narrow
construction to section 3(8) of COGSA.
3. American Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitration May Provide
Inadequate Protection for the Rights of Cargo Owners
The cargo owner in Sky Reefer asserted that enforcement of the
Japanese arbitration clause would lessen the carrier's liability in that
the arbitrators might apply the Japanese version of the Hague Rules,
providing the carrier with a defense unavailable under COGSA, or
would apply COGSA improperly."* The majority held that this claim
was premature and that the cargo owner would be protected anyway
because the District Court could review the Japanese arbitrators.
49
However, from a practical standpoint, judicial review of arbitral awards
may provide inadequate protection for the rights of cargo owners.
To permit arbitration to proceed in a foreign forum and to
determine afterwards whether the arbitrators' application of law has
in fact lessened the carrier's liability would not only lead to uncertain-
ty and delay but would also ignore the practical difficulty a cargo
owner would have in contesting an arbitration decision. 5° In Wilko
v. Swan, 5' the Supreme Court recognized the burdens a party would
face in challenging foreign arbitrators' application of U.S. law:
[Findings under the statute] must be not only determined but applied by
the arbitrators withoutjudicial instruction on the law. As their award may
be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete
record of their proceedings, the arbitrators' conception of the legal
meaning of... statutory requirements... cannot be examined. Power
147 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2329; see supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. This argument withstood
judicial scrutiny in Indussa:
A clause making a claim triable only in a foreign court could almost certainly lessen
liability if the law which the court would apply was neither the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act nor the Hague Rules. Even when the foreign court would apply one or
the other of these regimes, requiring trial abroad might lessen the carrier's liability
since there could be no assurance that it would apply them in the same way as
would an American tribunal subject to the uniform control of the Supreme Court,
and 3(8) can well be read as covering a potential and not simply a demonstrable
lessening of liability.
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Knott v. Botany
Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900) (nullifying choice of law provision under the Harter Act where
British law would permit carrier to exempt itself in a bill of lading from liability for its own
negligence).
149 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
150 Id. at 2333-34 n.8 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Serious problems of uncertainty and delay
result from judicial review of any foreign forum's decision, but the problems are particularly
acute in the context of arbitration.
151 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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to vacate an award is limited.'52
The Supreme Court later acknowledged that these problems
associated with challenging foreign arbitration may in some cases be
obviated by the United States' adoption of the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 5 ' which permits each signatory country to refuse the en-
forcement of an arbitration award where "the recognition or enforce-
ment of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that coun-
try.'" 4 Using this Convention as justification, the Sky Reefer majority
insisted: "Were there no subsequent opportunity for review and were
we persuaded that 'the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue
statutory remedies .... we would have little hesitation in condemning
the agreement as against public policy.""5" However, despite these
hortatory assurances, the majority cites no authority in which a federal
court has actually refused to enforce a foreign arbitral award on public
policy grounds under the Convention.
Thus, the difficulty that a cargo owner would face in challenging
a foreign arbitral tribunal's decision calls the reasoning of the Sky
Reefer majority into question. Because judicial review of foreign
arbitration would provide a cargo owner with uncertain hope of
adequate redress, it is reasonable to argue that any arbitration in a
foreign forum which might reduce a carrier's obligations below that
which COGSA guarantees is a potential lessening of liability within the
meaning of COGSA.
B. The Indussa Rule is not Necessarily Incompatible with
International Comity
The majority in Sky Reefer strongly suggested that failure to enforce
a foreign arbitration clause would damage "contemporary principles of
152 Id. at 436 (invalidating a forum selection clause as an impermissible waiver of rights
provided by the Securities Act of 1933). The Court in Wiko listed the limited circumstances,
pursuant to statute, under which a United States District Court may vacate an arbitration
award (e.g. corruption of the arbitrators). Id. at 437 n.22 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1952)); see
also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Company, 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(stating the limitations ofjudicial review in foreign arbitration).
153 See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 (recognizing without deciding that fraud alleged under the
Securities Exchange Act could be raised under the Convention in challenging the
enforcement of a foreign arbitrator's award); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (stating that U.S. courts will have the opportunity
under the Convention to ensure that the parties' legitimate interests in the foreign
arbitrators' enforcement of antitrust laws have been addressed).
154 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, (1970) art. V(2)(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970)).
155 Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, SA v. M/V Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2330 (1995)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19).
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international comity and commercial practice."'56 The Court placed
great emphasis on the reasoning of The Bremen that "[t]he expansion
of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept.that
all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts."
15 7
However, this view of the issue places too much emphasis on the
"international" aspect of foreign arbitration clauses in bills of lading
and too little on their adhesionary nature.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent to Sky Reefer, stated:
The concerns about invalidating freely negotiated forum selection clauses
that this Court expressed in The Bremen . .. have no bearing on the
validity of the provisions in bills of lading that are commonly recognized
as contracts of adhesion. Our international obligations do not require us
to enforce a contractual term that was not freely negotiated by the
parties. Much less do they require us to ignore the clear meaning of
COGSA-itself the product of international negotiations-which forbids
enforcement of clauses lessening the carrier's liability.5 '
This distinction between the freely negotiated contract in The Bremen
and the take-or-leave adhesionary clause in Sky Reefer finds support in
The Bremen decision itself. In The Bremen, the Court recognized the
validity of the Indussa rule under COGSA and stated that COGSA was
not applicable to the case before the Court. 59  Thus, the valid
concerns of the Court in The Bremen of not discouraging foreign trade
156 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2328. The Court was concerned that failure to enforce the
clause would result in an interpretation of the Hague Rules contrary to that of every other
nation to address the issue and would violate the purposes of the Convention by
"disparag[ing] the authority or competence of international forums for dispute resolution."
Id.; see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's belief that statutes passed
by other signatories to the Hague Rules which made foreign forum selection clauses
unenforceable indicated an intentional departure from the Hague Rules that is not present
in COGSA. See supra note 53. Stevens stated that the opposite conclusion is at least as
possible:
[Tlhese foreign nations believed non-enforcement of foreign forum selection
clauses was consistent with their international obligations, and they passed these
statutes to make that explicit. If anything, then, these statutes demonstrate that
several foreign countries agree that the United States courts' consistent inter-
pretation of COGSA does not contravene our mutual treaty obligations.
Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 2328 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company, 407 U.S. 1, 9
(1972)); see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
158 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 See supra note 79. The decisions adhering to the Indussa rule similarly distinguish The
Bremen as not applicable to COGSA cases. See, e.g., Conklin & Garrett, Ltd. v. M/V Finnrose,
826 F.2d 1441, 1442 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that The Bremen involved a negotiated contract
for towage and not a bill of lading and holding: "'The ruling in Zapata [Bremen] controls the
field of admiralty to the extent that no federal legislation to the contrary is on the books.'
We hold that in this case COGSA is applicable and controlling.") (citation omitted); Union
Insurance Society of Canton v. S.S. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing The
Bremen from COGSA cases because Congress had enunciated a specific policy regarding the
latter subject which therefore took precedence over the general policy of The Bremen).
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by insisting on resolving all disputes in America are arguably not
relevant to a situation in which the international agreement is not a
"solemn contract" but is instead a bill of lading dominated by the
superior bargaining power of the carrier.
Furthermore, even if the concerns of The Bremen are at issue in a
maritime bill of lading, a credible argument can be made that failing
to enforce foreign forum selection clauses promotes, rather than
discourages, international commerce and comity. Denying the validity
of foreign forum selection clauses in bills of lading would force parties
to resolve disputes within limited parameters and therefore increase
the certainty and uniformity of the bills' enforceability in known,
accessible fora. As a result, the international financial community
would have increased reliance upon the negotiability of the bills, and
the relevant parties to an international transaction-buyer and seller,
carrier, marine insurer, and guarantors of letters of credit-would have
greater confidence to enter into such transactions.' 60
The majority likely reacted too quickly in enforcing the foreign
arbitration clause in Sky Reefer, because of its effect on foreign law and
foreign courts, for fear of trampling upon the sovereignty of other
nations. This invocation of the "international contract talisman" 6'
appears to disregard the more practical benefits to international
commercial harmony that would inure from failing to enforce the
clause.
C. The Indussa Rule as Applied to Foreign Arbitration Clauses Does
not Necessarily Bring COGSA into Conflict with the FAA
Justice Stevens implied in his dissent to Sky Reefer that the majority
may only have rejected the clear precedent of the Indussa line of cases
so as "to avoid a perceived conflict with another federal statute, the
Federal Arbitration Act... ."162 The FAA exempts from enforceabili-
ty an arbitration clause that is revocable as a contract "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity."163  Stevens reasoned that
COGSA 3(8) provides just such an independent ground and that
clauses in violation of section 3(8) should therefore be exempted from
the general policy of the FAA.' 64
160 See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
162 Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2336 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
163 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
164 Sy Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2337 (StevensJ, dissenting). Stevens addressed the policies
of the two statutes and found them to be harmonious:
COGSA seeks to ameliorate the inequality in bargaining power that comes from a
particular form of adhesion contract. The FAA seeks to ensure enforcement of
freely-negotiated agreements to arbitrate .... [F]oreign arbitration clauses in bills
of lading are not freely-negotiated. COGSA's policy is thus directly served by
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If the two statutes can be read in this way so as not to conflict, the
Sky Reefer majority need not have gone to such great lengths to enforce
the foreign arbitration clause as not violative of COGSA, despite clear
precedent to the contrary.
V. Conclusion
In light of the gaps in logic in the majority's reasoning identified
in Part IV, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer appears to
be wrongly decided and could result in unintended and harmful
effects on international commerce. 65 While the Court was certainly
correct in supporting the proposition from The Bremen that the
expanding world economy cannot permit the United States to "insist
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts,"'66 the Court went too far in upholding this
principle at the expense of enforcing an adhesionary clause. The
Court could have found a middle ground that harmonized the goal of
international comity with the need to protect contracting parties with
inferior bargaining power.6
The great weight of authority and logic suggest that foreign forum
selection clauses do result in a practical (if not technical) lessening of
a carrier's liability in violation of COGSA.'" However, COGSA's
goal of protecting cargo owners can be met without insisting on an
American forum and damaging international comity in the process.
Instead of requiring blanket enforcement of foreign forum
selection and arbitration clauses in bills of lading, the Court should
making these clauses illegal; and the FAA's policy is not disserved thereby. In
contrast, allowing such adhesionary clauses to stand serves the goals of neither
statute.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see supra notes 34, 112 and accompanying text.
165 Justice Stevens complained of the effect of the Court's decision:
The majority's reasoning is not, of course, limited to foreign fora as accessible as
Tokyo. A carrier who truly wished to relieve itself of liability might select an outpost
in Antarctica as the setting for arbitration of all claims. Under the Court's
reasoning, such a clause presumably would be enforceable.
Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2335 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
167 It is clear that modem principles of international comity do not support U.S. courts
interpreting COGSA to require application of only American law in American fora. Many of
our trading partners have their own domestic legislation that should apply with equal force
to the same bills of lading that COGSA purports to cover. Just because a foreign forum
selection clause lessens a carrier's liability under COGSA (at least this was so before Sky
Reefer--see supra part IV.A), that does not mean that the carrier is then automatically subject
to American law in American fora. A middle ground is possible. See infra notes 169-172 and
accompanying text.
168 See supra part IVA Justice Stevens effectively critiqued the majority's reasoning
regarding this issue as follows: "The Court's decision in this case is an excellent example
of overzealous formalism. By eschewing a commonsense reading of 'lessening [of] liability,'
the Court has drained these words of much of their potency." Sky Reefer, 115 S. Ct. at 2337
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
1996] FOREIGN ARBITRATION CLAUSES
have instead required that the weaker contracting party receive actual
notice of the clause before entering into the contract 69 and that the
chosen forum bear a reasonable relation to the transaction evidenced by
the bill.' 70  In this way, not all foreign forum selection and arbitra-
tion clauses are unenforceable under COGSA, only those of which the
cargo owner has no actual notice or in which the forum is so far
removed from the transaction as to be unreasonable for the cargo
owner to have to resolve its dispute there. These two requirements
provide a substitute for the hard bargaining and negotiation absent in
bill of lading contracts and, in so doing, make the international comity
concerns of The Bremen relevant in the COGSA context, providing the
requirements are met. '
. This method protects the owner of goods from a carrier inserting
a clause requiring dispute resolution in a remote forum and thereby
effectively insulating itself from liability. At the same time, this
proposal recognizes the availability and competence of foreign fora,
under fair and appropriate circumstances, and demonstrates the
willingness of United States courts to defer to international comity
concerns.
72
Thus, the Sky Reefer majority, in trying to bring the Court's
guidance to lower courts in conformity with valid concerns of
international comity and modern international commerce, likely went
farther than necessary. The competing interests of international
169 See State Establishment for Agricultural Product Training v. M/V Wesermunde, 838
F.2d 1576, 1581 (1 1th Cir. 1981) (determining enforceability of foreign arbitration clause and
holding that:
[I]t is proper to require that a shipper be given actual notice of a provision that
arguably conflicts with the protections afforded him under certain federal Acts, such
as COGSA and the Harter Act, where those Acts are traditionally incorporated by
reference into all bills of lading.);
supra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
170 See Wesermunde, 838 F.2d at 1581 (stating-
While we do not believe that arbitration in and of itself is per se violative of
COGSA's provisions, especially in light of Congress' encouragement of arbitration
by its enactment of the Arbitration Act .... the court does believe that a provision
requiring arbitration in a foreign country that has no connection with either the
performance of the bill of lading contract or the making of the bill of lading
contract is a provision that would conflict with COGSA's general purpose of not
allowing carriers to lessen their risk of liability.).
171 See supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
172 Professor Black believed that another solution was possible:
I will then say that the solution would have to be a single international court of
appeals, whereto judgments interpreting COGSA rendered in the national courts
of last resort, could be brought by the nonprevailing party. Such a court should
control its own jurisdiction; appeals to it should be heard at its discretion, as with
our own Supreme Court's certiorari procedure, for much non-uniformity is trivial
or at least tolerable, like some intercircuit differences in our system. But, on
application by a party, the court should have the power to take up and decide any
case hinging on the interpretation of COGSA.
Black, supra note 142 at 370 (emphasis in original). Professor Black's proposal appears to
adequately address both the international comity and adhesion contract concerns.
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comity, on the one hand, and the protection of contracting parties
from adhesion contracts, on the other, could be better harmonized if
the Court were to modify its holding in Sky Reefer to only permit the
enforcement of foreign forum selection and arbitration clauses in
maritime bills of lading if the cargo owner has actual notice of the
chosen forum and the forum is reasonably related to the transaction
itself.
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